IS PLATINGA'S ARGUMENT FOR GOD INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN FREE WILL?

Authors

  • Marina Garner Centro Universitário Adventista de São Paulo (Unasp)

Keywords:

Alvin Plantinga, Argumento ontológico modal, Argumento do livre-arbítrio, Wes Morrison.

Abstract

Wes Morriston escreveu alguns artigos afirmando a incompatibilidade do Argumento Ontológico Modal de Alvin Plantinga e o Argumento do Livre Arbítrio contra o problema do mal. De acordo com ele, o Argumento Ontológico Modal defende um Deus essencialmente bom e livre em oposição ao Argumento do Livre Arbítrio, que defende que o melhor tipo de liberdade é a liberdade significativa, justificando a pessoa de Deus ao nos criar com tal liberdade. Nesse trabalho tentaremos resumir os argumentos e a posição de Morriston. Concluindo, veremos que há razões para concordar com ambos os argumentos de Plantinga sem entrar em contradição.

Palavras-chaves: Alvin Plantinga; Argumento ontológico modal; Argumento do livre-arbítrio; Wes Morrison.

Abstract: Wes Morriston has written a few articles claiming the incompatibility of Alvin Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Argument and the Free Will Argument against the problem of evil. According to him, the Modal Ontological Argument defends an essentially good and free God in opposition to the Free Will Argument, which defends that the best kind of freedom is the significant freedom (SF), justifying God creating us with such freedom. In this paper, we attempt to summarize the arguments and Morriston’s position. In conclusion, we will see that there are reasons to agree with both of Plantinga’s arguments without falling in to a contradiction.

Key words: Alvin Plantinga; Modal ontological argument; Free will argument; Wes Morriston.

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References

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SENOR, T. Defending divine freedom. In: KVANVIG, J. (Ed.). Oxford Studies: Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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Published

2016-07-04

How to Cite

GARNER, M. IS PLATINGA’S ARGUMENT FOR GOD INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN FREE WILL?. Kerygma, Engenheiro coelho (SP), v. 10, n. 1, p. 123–138, 2016. Disponível em: https://unasp.emnuvens.com.br/kerygma/article/view/669. Acesso em: 22 nov. 2024.

Issue

Vol. 10 No. 1 (2014)

Section

Artigos

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