
IS PLANTINGA'S ARGUMENT FOR GOD INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN FREE WILL?

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Abstract / Resumo

② **W**es Morrison has written a few articles claiming the incompatibility of Alvin Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument and the Free Will Argument against the problem of evil. According to him, the Modal Ontological Argument defends an essentially good and free God in opposition to the Free Will Argument, which defends that the best kind of freedom is the significant freedom (SF), justifying God creating us with such freedom. In this paper, we attempt to summarize the arguments and Morrison's position. In conclusion, we will see that there are reasons to agree with both of Plantinga's arguments without falling in to a contradiction.

Key words: Alvin Plantinga; Modal ontological argument; Free will argument; Wes Morrison.

② **W**es Morrison escreveu alguns artigos afirmando a incompatibilidade do Argumento Ontológico Modal de Alvin Plantinga e o Argumento do Livre Arbítrio contra o problema do mal. De acordo com ele, o Argumento Ontológico Modal defende um Deus essencialmente bom e livre em oposição ao Argumento do Livre Arbítrio, que defende que o melhor tipo de liberdade é a liberdade significativa, justificando a pessoa de Deus ao nos criar com tal liberdade. Nesse trabalho tentaremos resumir os argumentos e a posição de Morrison. Concluindo, veremos que há razões para concordar com ambos os argumentos de Plantinga sem entrar em contradição.

Palavras-chaves: Alvin Plantinga; Argumento ontológico modal; Argumento do livre-arbítrio; Wes Morrison.

In the realm of Christian apologetics and the doctrine of God, all arguments would ideally be in perfect accord. Arguments such as the Cos-

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mological argument, the Ontological argument, the Teleological arguments and defenses of God's existence in face of evil, among others, would best be brought up together with perfect philosophical harmony in defense of theism. However, in recent years, some philosophers, especially compatibilists, have pointed out what seems to be contradictions existing between these arguments. In order to maintain free will, libertarianism has had to stand up to these issues. An example of this debate can be seen in the compatibilists' use of the arguments of Wes Morriston against the compatibility of the God seen in Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument (hereafter MOA) and his Free Will Defense (hereafter FWD).

This paper will survey both of Plantinga's arguments, analyze Morriston's argument against their compatibility, and finally propose several possible solutions for the problem. These possible solutions will give libertarians the option to safely make use of both arguments as they defend their faith.

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND ITS THEOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS

124

Anselm's Ontological Argument

The Ontological Argument was originally made popular by Anselm of Canterbury and has influenced theological and philosophical thought for centuries (ST. ANSELM, 1965). This argument, along with others are part of a group of rational arguments for the existence of God. The argument has *a priori* premises that can be summarized in the following way:

1. Our understanding that the greatest conceivable being is a being above which no greater being can be conceived.
2. The idea that the best conceivable being exists in the mind.
3. A being which exists both in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only in the mind.
4. If the greatest conceivable being only exists in the mind, then we can conceive of a greater being— the one which exists in reality.



5. We cannot be imagining something that is greater than the best conceivable being.
6. Therefore, the best conceivable being, by definition, exists in reality.

It was not long until this argument received its first criticism by Gaunilo of Marmoutier and later, with more sophisticated criticism from people like Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Douglas Gasking, among many others. Many philosophers, on the other hand, saw great potential in the argument and further developed it.

Alvin Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument

In an attempt to detail or even improve the argument, many modern philosophers have critiqued Anselm's Ontological Argument (e.g. Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne). As an alternative to this argument, Alvin Plantinga developed what is called the Modal Ontological Argument (SENNETT, 1998). To start, he includes an idea that was probably what Anselm had in mind, but did not express in detail in his argument. It is the idea of *possible worlds* and *maximal excellence*.

Plantinga explains that there are different possible realities in every possible world; for example, there may be a possible world (W) in which Trinity International University is in Tulsa, OK, and not in Deerfield, IL. However, there may be even a possible world (W') in which TIU does not even exist. Thus, TIU's existence in W is greater than its non-existence in W'. Plantinga also understands that Anselm's fourth premise is too much of a concession, hence the introduction of the *possibility* of a being that has maximal greatness. He also eliminates the idea that a necessary existence is a perfection, a problem that is present in most of the propositions of the ontological argument. With these modifications, Plantinga's MOA is defended with the following premises:

1. A being has *maximal excellence* in a given possible world (W) if, and only if, it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2. A being has *maximal greatness* if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)



4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.
5. Therefore, (by axiom S5), it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists (PLATINGA, 1974a, p. 100).

There are three obvious theological propositions set out in this argument about this maximally great being: his omniscience, his omnipotence and his perfect goodness. The MOA argument therefore defends a God of complete perfection and a God of aseity, that is, a God that is dependent on nothing else and is self-existent.

THE FREE WILL DEFENSE (FWD) AND ITS THEOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS

126

The FWD for the problem of evil has been attributed in recent years to the hard work of Alvin Plantinga (1974b). Although roughly formulated since Augustine (AUGUSTINE, 1964, p. 36), the biggest contribution for the Christian faith has been done by him. With “The Nature of Necessity” and later popularized book “Freedom, Evil and God”, Plantinga has made an extensive and chiseled case against God’s moral responsibility over the evil in the world and the logical problem of evil.

Plantinga summarized the FWD as follows:

A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some



of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good (AUGUSTINE, 1964, p. 30).

This argument is in clear opposition to determinism as well as compatibilism, for it requires the free choices of significantly free agents. The whole objective of this is twofold: 1) to defend human free will and 2) to reject God's moral responsibility for the evil in the world. An equally important part of this defense is its theological proposition. Obviously, it still entails an entirely good God, a God who acts on coherency and on the greatest good in behalf of human beings, that is, significant freedom.

WES MORRISTON'S ARGUMENT AGAINST ALVIN PLANTINGA'S DOUBLE PROPOSITION

127

Wes Morriston is a professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder and has dedicated much of his academic writings to the doctrine of God, including many apologetic arguments. One of his debates has been on the freedom of God in relationship to two prominent defenses of theism, namely, the MOA and the FWD.² With the remodeling of the Ontological argument done by Alvin Plantinga, the criticism is to the two arguments that, according to Morriston, do not successfully coexist without a contradiction. The first of his attempts against Plantinga's ideas was an article with the title "Is God Significantly Free?" (MORRISTON, v. 2, n. 3, p. 257-264, 1985).

To understand the apparent contradiction, one must understand that the basis of it all is the concept of "significant freedom". For Plantinga, only significant freedom is important in his FWD:

If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will per-

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² "Is God significantly free?", "Is Plantinga's God omnipotent?", "What is so good about moral freedom?"



form the action, or that he won't. It is within his power, at the time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it. [...] I shall say that an action is morally significant, for a given person, if it would be wrong for him to perform the action but right to refrain or vice versa (PLATINGA, 1974a, p. 29).

For Plantinga, significant freedom is not compatible with determinism.³ If it were, God could have created beings with an irresistible impulse to do what is morally good, consequently diminishing their freedom and responsibility.

Turning to the MOA, what is important for the idea is the concept of "maximal greatness" and "maximal excellence", which, for Plantinga, to entail the existence of God, has to be something that God has in every possible world (PLATINGA, 1974a, p. 108). As Thomas Flint puts it, those who accept both the MOA and the FWD may be called an *Anselmian Libertarian* (FLINT, v. 20, n. 2, p. 255, 1983). For Morrision, it is easy to see that with the presuppositions of the FWD, the God of MOA is neither significantly free nor morally perfect. He arrives at this by showing that God is not significantly free because he is morally perfect in every possible world and not able to do what is evil. Since moral goodness presupposes significant freedom, it follows that God is not morally good, which is very close to saying that God is not morally perfect. Summarizing the problem, Morrision (1985, p. 258) puts it this way:

The problem, in short, is that the presuppositions of the Free Will Defense entail that moral goodness cannot be an essential property of any person, whereas the premises of the Ontological Argument entail that moral goodness is an essential property of at least one person, viz. God. Then it seems that a theist cannot consistently give [*sic*] the Free Will Defense if he accepts the Ontological Argument and vice versa.

Defending that God is free in regard to some actions does not, according to Morrision, do anything to solve the problem. The author in fact agrees that God may be free to perform an act of refrain from it, for example, to actualize any world he would prefer; however, the fact that he is essentially good entails

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³ In opposition to Hobbes, Hume and Mill, who defend that free will and determinism are completely compatible. The idea is that there could be a world in which every moment in the past determined a unique future and whose inhabitants were still free beings.



that he is never free when anything morally significant is at stake. Whenever, from the moral point of view, something is to be chosen, God's decision is completely determined by his nature.

Morrison discusses four different strategies that a theist might use to solve the problem. First, (1) a theist might admit that God is not significantly free (SF), accepting that he is not good in the sense that we know of, namely, in the moral sense (that which is involved in the FWD). By this, the theist would also have to deny that this constitutes an imperfection in God's nature. It might be said, Morrison comments, one out of two options. The first is that God is essentially good and thus cannot be SF. His kind of goodness is infinitely superior to the sort of goodness that is realized when one of the significantly free creatures chooses good over evil. To comment on this attempt of an answer, Morrison says that this would be a correct view if our intent is only to praise God for who he is (his goodness), as long as we do not praise him in a moral sense that presupposes moral responsibility. Gratitude, in this perspective, would be difficult to deal with. The second option is that God is free in the sense that he is free from temptations and all the human decisions and mental conflicts. Even if we were to say that God has a different kind of freedom that is still not the significant kind that Plantinga asserts.

129

The second (2) strategy is for the theist to say that God is perfectly good in a sense that does not presuppose SF. However, in Morrison's view, the moral goodness that can only be enjoyed by beings that have significant freedom (SF) is very superior than the sort that would be enjoyed by creatures who are not SF. If it is not superior than the alternative, God would not be justified in creating human beings with SF and would be an evil in itself in need of an explanation. And if it is superior, then the problem is the same as making the essentially perfection and goodness of the MOA disappear.

The third (3) way would be to state that SF is good for human beings, however not for God (WIERENGA, 2002, p. 425-436; PRUSS, 2003, p. 211-223). Morrison simply dismisses these options by saying that putting God in a different category would be an *ad hoc* and cannot be defended.

The fourth (4) and last option is that the theist would have to defend God's SF, throwing out, however, the concept of a morally perfect God. The explanation used, of course, is the possible world(s) in which, if God is significantly free, he may go wrong. If there is a possible world in which God is not morally perfect, then the MOA is also destroyed.

As a conclusion to this article, Morrison suggests a revision of the maximal greatness in the MOA. His suggestion entails that one must make a

distinction between moral excellences (doing nothing wrong) and nonmoral excellences (omnipotence, omniscience, etc.). Thus, God could have nonmoral excellences in all possible worlds, but not moral excellences. Hence, the premises would look like this:

(1*) A being has maximal nonmoral greatness in a given world only if it has maximal nonmoral excellence in every world.

(2*) A being has maximal nonmoral excellence in a given world only if it has omniscience and omnipotence in that world.

The objective with this change is to allow the MOA to conclude the existence of God (a omniscient and omnipotent God), however not morally perfect as most theists would prefer. For Morrision, in that case, the greatest being is defined below:

(1**) A being is maximally great in a given world if and only if: (i) it possesses maximal moral excellence in that *world* and (ii) it possesses maximal nonmoral excellence in *every* world.

130

This radical modification, in conclusion, is to say that, for Morrision, it is impossible for a being to be morally perfect in every possible world. Thus, the maximum that can be done in favor of our conception of God is to say that He is a being that may be God (in a traditional theist sense) in this world, but not in other possible worlds, that is, if the MOA is reviewed as to be in accordance with the FWD.

In another article entitled “What is so good about moral freedom?” (MORRISTON, 2000, p. 344-358), Wes Morrision (2000, p. 3464) once again states the problem:

This would lead one to expect Plantinga to hold that God is morally free to do evil even if he never actually chooses to do any. But no. Plantinga, like Swinburne, holds that God is essentially good – that there is no possible world in which God is not morally good. Why? Because God is the Greatest Possible Being, and because Plantinga thinks God would be ‘greater’ if he possesses all his great-making characteristics in every possible world. [...] But surely this is inconsistent. If significant freedom is required for moral responsibility and moral goodness in human creatures, why is it not required for moral responsibility and moral goodness in God? It looks as if con-



sistency would require Plantinga to choose between saying that God is essentially good, and thus lacks moral freedom, and saying that moral freedom is a very great good for human beings.

In this article, however, he goes even further with his arguments. To start the debate, he races to give a supposed solution for those in distress:

- I. Human beings are both morally responsible and morally free;
- II. In human beings, moral responsibility does presuppose moral freedom;
- III. God, on the other hand, is not morally free; his nature is such that he cannot choose between good and evil;
- IV. Nevertheless, God is morally responsible for his actions, and is perfectly good in the distinctively moral sense.

To explain how this might work, Morrision shows the possibility of dropping the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) in relation to moral responsibility and how that could work in favor of the initial answer to the problem. In this way, since God is the initial cause to everything and nothing limits or determines his behavior, there would be no problem to drop PAP, for God would continue to have strong moral responsibility over his actions. For human beings, however, it would be a problem. That is the case because human beings can't be first causes. They are caused by God, and if they were created to do only what is right (like many say God "should" have done), they would not be morally responsible for choosing right over wrong actions. Ultimately, God would be morally responsible. Hence, the creation of human beings requires SF.

To criticize his own suggestion, Morrision then shows how that theory would not work by theorizing about two fictitious groups: Group Alpha and Group Beta. Group Alpha is naturally good. They were created by something greater than they were and were made with a good nature, but are not morally responsible for their good actions exactly because they were made that way. Group Beta, on the other hand, were not created by something greater; however, like the Alpha group, are naturally good. Thus, since nothing gave them their good nature – they just created themselves out of nothing – they are morally responsible for their actions.



With this analogy, Morrision intends to show that, even though human beings have been created “free creatures”, they cannot be morally responsible for their good actions because they were created that way, and God, on the other hand, should be praised for his nature, which is not determined to do good as the creatures that were already created with a good nature.

Thus, another problem surfaces for the MOA vs. FWD. Why is God not ‘subject to’ his nature, as they (the beta group) would be ‘subject to’ theirs? To start, Morrision already makes a distinction between God and the Beta group (if they existed), namely, that God is not a contingent being. He exists in all possible worlds. However, for Morrision, that really doesn’t make any difference, for the question concerns their nature and not their origin or persistence in existing in all possible worlds.

One option Morrision offers is that God is not subject to his nature, because there is no distinction between God and his nature, since he is identical with his nature. The second option is that God is not subject to his nature because he is causally responsible for it.

He disagrees with the first option because, although he is identical with his nature, he is not identical with the various components of his nature, thus leaving open the possibility that God is subject to the attributes that make up his nature – including the attribute of goodness. There are contingent and essential properties in God, and if he were to be identical with his nature, then he would only be able to have essential properties. His example for contingent properties is creating creatures that can freely serve him. Summarizing the premises, he states:

1. If God were identical with his nature, none of his intrinsic properties could be contingent.
2. But some of God’s intrinsic properties are contingent.
3. Therefore, God is not identical with his “nature” (MORRISTON, 2000, p. 355).

The second option, for Morrision, is also not good because a cause must in some sense be prior to its effect.⁴ The relationship must be at least asymmetric. It follows that if God causes his own nature, he must be causally prior to his own nature.

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⁴ Also called Divine “Source Incompatibilism”



His conclusion in this article is that if God is not identical or responsible for his nature, it would seem that he is subject to that nature, just as we are subject to our own nature, thus not responsible for what flows as of necessity from his nature. If God is subject to his nature, he cannot be morally responsible for his actions, and perfectly good in the distinctively moral sense. So, to reconcile essential goodness and the FWD is doomed to failure and Plantinga would be forced to choose between the two arguments.

AN ARGUMENT FOR THE COMPATIBILITY OF PLANTINGA'S MOA AND THE FWD

If viewed a little closer, the problem is actually old, but with a new format. It is called the problem of divine freedom, a very common and extensively dealt with problem.⁵ This problem has been dealt with by many different perspectives; however, I would like to deal specifically with the problems that Wes Morriston mentions, namely 1) that the MOA cannot be compatible with the FWD; 2) that God is not free in accordance with his nature because he cannot be identical to his nature; 3) that FWD being required for human being and not for God is not defensible; 4) that significant freedom (SF) is a superior kind of freedom in all situations. In my conclusion, I will also be analyzing the viability of the use of this argument by compatibilism/soft determinism, as seen in Feinberg's *No One Like Him*:

The problem is that if an agent must be capable of doing or refraining from an act in order to be significantly free, then in regard to his own moral choices and deeds, a morally perfect God cannot be significantly free. [...] I believe this is a significant problem for anyone committed to libertarian free will and a theological system that incorporates it. On the other hand, there is no problem for a soft deterministic system like mine. For God can be essentially morally good and still be free in a compatibilistic sense (FEINBERG, 2006, p. 730-731).

Significant Freedom and to whom it is required

From the very beginning, it must be stated that there are good reasons to believe that SF is required for human beings and not for God. God is the

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⁵ See Thomas Senor (2008); Brian Leftow (2007, p. 185-206); Edward Wieranga (2002, p. 425-436); Edward Wieranga (2007, p. 207-216).

initial cause, nothing limits or determines his behavior, thus he is completely morally responsible for all his actions even without PAP. Human beings, on the other hand, cannot be first causes because their first cause is God. If they were left without PAP, God would be morally responsible for their actions.

In Wes Morriston's first article, the affirmation that SF is required for human beings and not for God is quickly dismissed for being *ad hoc* and not being able to be defended. Fortunately, as the years went by, he noticed the actual validity of that argument, and in the year 2000 gave a detailed response (MORRISTON, 2000, p. 344-358).

His reasons to believe that this argument does not work are unsettling and not satisfactory (at least for me). Although I agree with the argument against God being responsible for his nature, one of the arguments was to deny the simplicity of God, that is, God is not identical to his nature but subject to his own nature. He "proves" this by bringing up God's contingent and necessary properties. However, Morriston's example for this is weak. The idea of a contingent property comes from his decision to create the world or not, or the creation of this world instead of any other. What I believe Morriston fails to understand is the difference between action and property.

According to the Oxford dictionary, property is defined as "an attribute, quality, or characteristic of something"⁶ Philosophers of religion would agree with this definition (LEFTOW, 2012), and understanding the word like that would mean that God's decision to make the world or the decision of which specific possible world he would actualize is not a property and cannot be compared to, for example, to God's goodness, power or truthfulness.

To be in coherence with the MOA and also to mere philosophical logic, God has to be self-derived, self-sufficient and completely independent of anything. However, since divine simplicity is "a lot to take on board", Wes Morriston's stubbornness on this issue would continue to deny this argument.⁷

Wes Morriston and God's essential freedom

Referring to the idea of essential freedom/goodness, Morriston gives a problematic affirmation, and one that is probably out of his reach: "(S)ince moral goodness presupposes significant freedom, it also follows that God is

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⁶ See definição em: <http://bit.ly/1m6Ls07>.

⁷ Morriston (2006, p. 93-96) wrote an article in response to Edward Wieranga's attempt to give an argument in favor of God's incompatibilistic. Once again he denies the aseity of God's properties.



not morally good, which is as near as [...]saying that God is not morally perfect" (MORRISTON, v. 2, n. 3, p. 257-264, 1985).

Morrison's idea in this defense was to say that SF is the only kind of freedom that could entail moral responsibility, hence the moral goodness as well. It is very dangerous to make such a committed statement especially since this is an ongoing and fervent discussion among philosophers of religion.

The problem of character formation and freedom of love

After affirming the validity of God's necessary goodness and freedom within his own nature, we turn to why God did not create humans with essential goodness. Other than the fact that humans are creatures, and thus would not be morally responsible if God caused them to be how they are, a theological argument is called for.

We must start however with two illustrations:

(1) Ann and Bruce have been dating for five years and have had enough time to get to know each other in order to assert their love for one another. Motivated by this love and will to have Ann by his side all his life, he asks her to marry him.

(2) Ann and Bruce have been dating for five years. However, Bruce by no means loves Ann and has tried to finish the relationship numerous times just to be manipulated by Ann to continue. One day, Ann pours a love potion in Bruce's orange juice, which makes Bruce fall madly in love with Ann and ask her to marry him.

To put each of these illustrations in categories it would be easy to differentiate which one illustrates free love and which illustrates forced love. It is also easy to understand that Free-Love (1) is much more desirable than Forced-Love (2). An act or emotion that is expressed because of a determination is not even remotely as ideal as that which is expressed by a person's own will without being causally determined. With this in mind, we could elaborate the argument as follows:

(L) A situation in which an agent x deterministically causes some agent y to express love toward x is less good than one in which x is the recipient



of an expression of love by y without x deterministically causing y to express love to x .

According to (L) we have a fairly significant reason to understand why God would prefer to create humans with SF instead of completely determining how they would act in relation not only to his moral law, but also to a relationship with him. In another perspective, SF is also good for the creatures in knowing that they are freely loved by their creator without their causally determining him to do so.

Biblically speaking, there is a very long history of explanation for why God necessarily created humans with significant freedom. Throughout the Bible we encounter a God who is very emphatic about worship, and that worship being from a sincere and honest heart.⁸ Chronologically, that begins with the creation of angels; however, one of those angels decided against this kind of worship, or any kind of worship and rebelled against his creator. Without concentrating on the details, if God had not created human beings with significant freedom, the conflict between good and evil would be useless and vindication of the name and reputation of God⁹ would not be necessary.

Furthermore, with the conflict between good and evil as a background, character formation is highly necessary.

Wes Morriston and compatibilism

Aside from the fact that Morriston's arguments are weak, the use of his arguments by compatibilists are problematic as well. Compatibilism doesn't gain much with this argument because they still have to deal with the problem of evil in the perspective of God being the author of the impulse given to human beings to freely choose evil. Although Morriston's objective was not to give compatibilism an extra point, it doesn't end up very successful anyway.

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⁸ See Heb. 13:15; Ps 20:11-12; Ps 34:1-3; Eph. 1:14; I Pet. 1:7;

⁹ See Dan 8:9-14 (DAVIDSON, 1996, p. 107-119). According to Davidson, the Hebrew verb *sdq* in this passage has the meaning of 'vindicate', since His Sanctuary was trembled down; John 17:4; Rom 3:24-26; One of the possibilities to interpret Ezekiel 28 is to see a reference to the enemy of God, Satan, in this passage. Richard Davidson demonstrated how the name of God had been defiled through the slanders of Satan among heavenly beings (DAVIDSON, 1996, p. 31-34). Job's story also shows the necessity of a vindication on the part of Job so that God would be victorious in the battle for his worship. The temptations given to Jesus by the devil in Matthew 4 show the attempt of the devil to receive worship.



CONCLUSION

In conclusion to this article, a defense in favor of the compatibilism between the MOA and the FWD is possible. Just like the FWD, a defense for this does not have to be proven (as most of the issues concerning God cannot be), but just shown as possible. This possibility was shown by 1) demonstrating that it is possible for SF to be beneficial for human beings but not for God; 2) establishing that God is first cause and thus has moral responsibility while human beings are created and thus need a source for moral responsibility; 3) manifesting skepticism as to the absolute idea that for moral goodness to exist, SF must exist; 4) exposing the benefits of God creating human beings with SF for the good states of affairs entails that free-love is more desirable than forced-love and free-worship is better than forced-worship, among other considerations.

Conclusion must also be made in terms of the use of Wes Morriston's arguments in favor of compatibilism and how that does not solve the enormous problem they have to deal with when the topic is the problem of evil.

137

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